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1 Background and Test Purpose 
This paper discusses short-window market reactions to management earnings forecasts 
and the impact of management earnings forecast specificity. Prior researches suggest that 
managers disclose relevant value information to market in order to reduce information 
asymmetry (Diamond , 1985; King et a l., 1990) , and this behavior can increases liquidity 
in the firm's stock and reduces the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia , 1991). As 
earnings signaling, management earnings forecast called MEF as following , can convey 
manager's belief about future earnings and has been used as one of important information 
to estimate firm's performance by market participants. 
MEFs are issued voluntarily at any time before final financial announcement on 
mature stock market , such as the US stock market. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) find that 
managers forecast earnings is try to move prevailing market expectations toward 
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management beliefs about future earnmgs, and an investor's beliefs or actions may be 
affected by the disclosure of a MEFs. A recent study (Klliott et al., 2011) suggests that 
investor's earnings fixation is reduced when they initially observe a disaggregated MEF 
and its component versus when they observe an aggregated MEF. 
According to the theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis, after information is issued, 
it is reacted into share price at once, and the trend of share price only associates with 
new information. Then, effect of share price reaction is equal for good news and bad news 
if information is issued equally by managers. However, numbers of empirical studies 
confirmed that managers reveal MEFs asymmetrically for good news and bad news. They 
argue that good news MEFs are issued voluntarily by managers in order to distinguish 
themselves from firms with bad news MEFs (Lev and Penman, 1990), bad news MEFs are 
issued voluntarily by managers in order to avoid litigation and reputational costs when 
the large decreases change in earnings occurs at final financial announcement day without 
any firm's warnings (Skinner, 1994; Francis et ai, 1994; Miller, 2002; Kothari, 2009; 
Roychowdhury et ai, 2012). This paper argues that there is asymmetric share pnce 
reaction to bad news MEFs and good news MEFs because of such manager's asymmetric 
MEFs issue behavior. Further, according to the argument that managers withhold and 
accumulated information when they sufferance worse performance (Kothari et al, 2009), 
so unexpected bad news may be withheld and saved up together, whereas good news are 
frequently leaked to the market, the share price reaction to bad news is expected to be 
larger than that to good news. 
The discussion of forecast specificity of MEFs is a very hot topic. Generally, there are 
five kinds of MEFs' forms issued by managers on stock market. That means managers 
can select point estimate, closed-interval estimate (range), open-interval estimate (minimum 
and maximum value) or qualitative estimate in their words to describe earnings predicted 
by them. Prior psychology researches (King et ai, 1990; Libby et ai, 2006) suggest that 
management will choose a guidance form to match the precision of their own information 
about firm's future, and management earnings forecast form matters to both investors 
and analysts. However, there are no consistent findings for the effect of forecast 
specificity of MEFs on asymmetric share price reaction. Some psychology literatures 
support the possible interaction between the forms of MEFs specificity and the precision 
of the signal, and their impact on share price. On the contrary, accounting literatures find 
no significant difference in market reaction between forecast forms of MEFs specificity. 
This paper makes a "conditional specificity" hypothesis similar to prior literature (Chan 
et al., 2009) for the lack of consistent empirical results in the prior literatures. 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate short-window share pnce reaction to the 
particular MEFs policy on Chinese stock market. Chinese stock market is a growing 
emerging market, and the phenomenon of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors also exist confirmed by local researchers. However, different from mature stock 
market, the MEFs policy of Chinese stock market is characteristic, and a combination 
form of voluntary and mandatory is adopted. At present, there is little study on MEFs 
forecast approaches on mature stock market, while there are a lot of researches on 
information disclosure policy. They support voluntary disclosure policy for the informative 
content, whereas support mandatory disclosure policy for avoiding managers' insider 
trading. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires the firms who suffered 
a larger earnings change to issue MEFs to the market in order to warn investors. 
However, the MEFs on Chinese stock market are usually revealed only for net profit or 
earnings per share data. Based on different development background for MEFs, there may 
be different empirical research conclusions about MEFs on Chinese stock market. 
2 Data and Research Method 
The sample comprises of Chinese listed compames which are followed by financial 
analysts, over the period 2005 to 2011. The annual MEFs are made by A share firms listed 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges covering period from June 2005 to April 2012. 
MEFs restricted by followed analysts' earnings forecast are because that the analysis in 
this paper focuses on using analysts' earnings forecast as news benchmark for classifying 
the types of news for MEFs. In addition, I choose annual MEFs because of limitation of 
analysts annual earnings forecast. The daily stock return, financial ratios which are used 
in regression model and the information of MEFs and analyst earnings forecast data are 
from CSMAR database developed by GT A. Because forecast specificity information of 
MEFs is contained in CSMAR database is only from 2005 to 2009, so two years (2010, 
2011) of forecast specificity information of MEFs are manually checked and read from 
website: http://www.eastmoney.com. 
I test asymmetric share price to MEFs from two aspects. First, whether the forecast 
approaches of MEFs affects share price reaction to the different sign of MEFs news or 
not is investigated. Equation (1) examine the different share price effect in magnitude for 
good news and bad news without forecast approach effect, using the analyst forecast basis 
of assessing news content. The regression equation (2) is conducted to examine that after 
controlling forecast approach (news content), the share price effect to different news 
content (forecast approach) as stated in H1 and H2. The regression equation (3.4) and 
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(3.5) are shown as follow: 
Where 
carj,t = a+ y1Dbad,j" * Dv,j,t+ y2D bad,j,t * Dm,j,,+ y3 D good,j" * Dv,j,,+ Y4Dgood,j,tDm,j,t 
+ y5 Sizej" + y6MEj" + Sj,t 
(1) 
(2) 
carj,t. Independent variable used to measure share price reaction to event window (-2, 
0), (0, 1) and (-2, +2), respectively. 
Dbad,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed to be bad news for firm j in 
year t, relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and 0 otherwise. 
Dgood,j". Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed to be good news for firm j in 
year t, relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and 0 otherwise. 
Du,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are issued voluntarilyby manager for firm 
j in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Dm,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are issued mandatorily by manager for 
firm j in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Sizej". The natural logarithm transformation of Size, the firm's market value of 
equity before MEFs announced. 
ME j ". The market to book value of firm j before MEFs announced. 
Second, I test "conditional specificity" hypothesis. In this topic, firstly, i want to 
confirm whether the point forecast form of MEFs is issued asymmetrically by managers 
to forecast different sign of MEFs news. I conduct descriptive statistics for forecast forms, 
forecast approach, and news signalling to test whether point forecast is issued asymmetri-
cally for bad news and good news. Further, logistic regression model (3) shown as follow 
is used to strengthen the results of descriptive statistics. 
(3) 
Pj,'. The probability of firm j disclose point forecast in year t. 
Dbad,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed bad news for firm j in year t, 
relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and 0 otherwise. 
Dgood,j". Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed good news for firm j in year t. 
relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and 0 otherwise. 
Sizej". The natural logarithm transformation of size, the firm's market value of 
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equity before MEFs announced. 
MBj,t. The market to book value of firm j before MEFs announced. 
Under the "conditional specificity" hypothesis, I also test the share pnce reaction to 
different forecast specificities (point, range, minimum and maximum) of MEFs. In order 
to test whether share price effect on point forecast form is larger than that on other 
forecast forms after controlling the sign of news, regression model (4) is designed for 
analyzing the impact of forecast specificity of MEFs (Chan et al., 2009). 
carj,t = a+ ~ {3bad, it Dbad,j,t * Di,j,t+ ~ {3good,j,tDgood,j,t * Di,j,t+ {3 size Sizej,t + {3mbMBj,t + Cj,t 
Where 
i= {point, range 
min,max} 
i= {point, range 
min,max} (4) 
carj,t. Independent variable used to measure share price reaction to event window (-2, 0), 
(0,1) and (-2, +2), respectively. 
Dbad,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed bad news for firm j in year t 
relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and a otherwise. 
Dgood,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are deemed good news for firm j in year t 
relative to the benchmark (mean analysts forecast earnings), and a otherwise. 
D;,j,t. Dummy variable set to 1 when MEFs are issued by manager using forecast form 
of i, and a otherwise, where i equals to point, range, minimum or maximum, respectively. 
Sizej,t. The natural logarithm transformation of size, the firm's market value of 
equity before MEFs announced. 
MBj,t. The market to book value of firm j before MEFs announced. 
Notably, the sIgn of MEFs is specified usmg analysts forecast benchmark, and 
forecast approaches are specified based on requirement of China MEFs' policy. Forecast 
forms of MEFs' specificity are defined in the light of managers' descriptions of net profit 
or earnings per share. Point forecast make a precise single numerical figure of net profit 
or earnings per share. (e.g. "we expect net profit to be 100,000CNY this year" or "we 
expect net profit to be increase (decrease) of 20 % over last year."). A range forecast 
contains a precise numeric range of net profit or earnings per share. (e.g. "net profit is 
predicted in the range of 70,000CNY and 100,000CNY this year" or "net profit is predicted 
increase (decrease) in the range of 10 % and 30 % over last year."). Minimum forecasts set 
to a minimum or lower bound to net profit or earnings per share. (e.g. "we expect net 
profit to be at least 70,000CNY this year." or "we expect net profit to be increase 
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(decrease) at least (at largest) 20 % over last year."). Maximum forecasts set a maximum 
or upper bound to net profit or earnings per share. (e.g. "we expect net profit to be at 
largest 100,000CNY this year." or "we expect net profit to be increase (decrease) at largest 
(at least) 20 % over last year.") Qualitative forecasts provide a general statement that is 
not capable of any precise numeric interpretation. 
3 Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: Asymmetric Information Test 
Based on managers' asymmetric disclosure behavior argument (Lev and Penman, 1990; 
Sinner, 1994; Francis et aI, 1994; Miller, 2002; Kothari, 2009; Roychowdhury et aI, 2012), 
I assume that negative share price effect to manager's bad earnings forecast is larger in 
absolute magnitude than the positive share price effect to manager's good earnmgs 
forecast, when the forecast is released by manager voluntarily or mandatorily respectively. 
It can be argued that because be withheld and accumulated bad news may be more likely 
to be exhibited greater asymmetric reactions because of grater information content. Then 
I propose the following hypothesis 1: 
Hi. The negative share price reaction to manager's bad earnings forecast is larger in 
absolute magnitude than the positive share price reaction to manager's good earnings 
forecast, when the manager's forecast is issued voluntarily or mandatorily, respectively. 
I assume that the market reaction to all the types of new information disclosure 
depend on the circumstances surrounding the release of the earnings forecast. China 
Securities Exchanges state that the firms, whose net profit increase or decrease more than 
50 % over the same period of previous year, have to release management earnings forecast 
to the market to warn investors. Others not included in this case, release disclosure 
management earnings forecast for voluntary. Based on environment of MEFs' policy on 
Chinese stock market, hypothesis 2 is proposed. 
H2. The share pnce reaction to bad or good news in mandatory MEFs is signifi-
cantly larger in absolute magnitude than the bad or good news in voluntary MEFs. 
According to univariate regresslOn results for MEFs news without forecast approach 
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effect, I find no different share price reaction to bad MEFs and to good MEFs at various 
selected event windows, inconsistent with prior empirical studies (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik 
and Lev, 1995; Kothari et al., 2009; Chan et al, 2009). And when adding the effect of 
forecast approaches of MEFs, the same results are also found for both forecast approaches 
at various event windows. These results can be interpreted by the managers' motivations 
of forecasting earnings. On China stock market, the policy of analysts forecast just 
experience more than 10 years. It is imperfect, and the relationship between managers and 
financial analyst is not close unlike that on mature stock market. Therefore, managers of 
China stock market forecast earnings to correct "unrealistic" analysts' forecast frequently. 
As a result, a relatively "full" or symmetric disclosure of private information is made, and 
then bad MEFs and good MEFs are expected to be unbiased. However, I find an 
interesting result at event window (-2, 0). Before MEFs disclosure day good news are 
leaked to stock market, and this large good news effect on share price comes from 
mandatory good MEFs. 
Hypothesis 3: Manager's Choice of Forecast Form of MEFs Specificity 
Hypothesis 3 is inspired by the argument that managers are impelled to be more 
precise and careful with their estimates when they disclose bad news (Roychowdhury, 
2012). Because bad news earnings forecasts are associated with greater uncertainty in a 
firm's operations (Li, 2006; Bloomfield, 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011), and 
tend to be scrutinized more closely by stock market participants. Further, according to the 
argument that manager withhold bad news for reducing strong implications for 
stakeholders, managers may be not reluctant to disclose the bad news until they are able 
to provide a precise estimate of the effect of bad news on earnings. Then, I propose 
hypothesis 3: 
H3. The point forecast is more likely to be issued in MEFs forecasting bad news than 
forecasting good news. 
Based on descriptive statistics of forecast news and forecast specificities after 
controlling forecast approaches, I find that managers tend to issue maximum forecast in 
voluntary MEFs case relative to in mandatory MEFs case. Moreover, managers tend to 
use relatively accurate range forecast form to issue bad news, especially in the case of 
voluntary MEFs. This result is further strengthened by the results of logistic regression 
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model, showing that point forecast form is issued asymmetrically by managers to bad 
news and good news, and is often used to forecast bad news than to forecast good news, 
supporting H3. 
Hypothesis 4: "conditional specificity" Hypothesis Test 
Libby et al. (2006) and some evidence from psychology literatures (Wallsten et aI., 
1986; Highhouse, 1994;) argued that point forecasts are perceived to be more precise than 
other forecast forms and thus they should evoke stronger share pnce responses than 
range or minimum or maximum forecast. Moreover, based on hypothesis 3, point forecast 
IS more likely to be issued by manager to forecast bad news than to forecast good news 
because of the precision of point forecast form. Therefore, I assume that if the point 
forecast form is considered to be more precise than others forecast forms by market 
participants, the stronger market reaction will be evoked for point forecast form. Then, I 
propose hypothesis 4: 
H4. After controlling the news types, the share pnce reaction to point MEFs IS 
greater than the share price reaction to range, minimum, maximum MEFs. 
First, usmg the univariate approach, I consider each form of forecast specificity 
separately and do not combine all forms of forecast specificity with all news outcomes in 
a single regression model. Based on benchmark of analysts' earnings forecast, share price 
reacts equally to bad news and good news for each forecast form of MEFs specificity 
except for maximum forecast form at various event windows and minimum forecast form 
at event window (-2, 0). This result indicate that for minimum forecast form, good news 
are more preemptive than bad news. I also find the same result for range forecast form 
at the period before MEFs disclosure day. I document that before MEFs disclosure day, 
good news are leaked to stock market using range forecast form usually. This result is 
new observation not mentioned in prior empirical studies. Different from prior empirical 
study's findings, I find no asymmetric market reaction to bad news and good news for 
point MEFs and range MEFs, which are considered as more precise by market partici-
pants. 
Second, even though some different findings are found in the days before MEFs 
disclosure day, the stock market reacts equally to point forecast form and other forecast 
forms at event windows (0,1) and (-2, +2). At event window (-2,0), maximum forecast 
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form drives a specificity result in bad news case, differing from pnor empirical studies 
based on mature stock market, which find that the minimum forecast form is some 
different with other forecast forms. After controlling bad news, market reacts stronger to 
maximum forecast form than range and minimum forecast forms. After controlling good 
news, market reacts stronger to minimum forecast form than range and point forecast 
forms, Moreover, from pair-wise test results, I find no evidence on supporting "conditional 
hypothesis" that the point forecast form can evoke a stronger market reaction than other 
forecast forms after controlling the sign of MEFs news. 
Notably, the results of this paper are based on Chinese stock market, which has a 
particular background of MEFs policy differing from other countries. Further, the test 
results of forecast form of MEFs specificity may be affected by restrictive sample date. 
CSMAR database only contains MEFs specificity information covering period from 2005 to 
2009. Specificity information of MEFs over two years (2010, 2011) were manually checked 
and read from website. These results may be affected by using analysts' earnings 
forecasts as proxy for market expectations. 
4 Innovations 
This study extends pnor studies from several aspects. First, different from pnor 
MEFs studies on mature stock market under a unitary system of voluntary forecast 
approach, this paper is fist time to investigate asymmetric share price reaction to the 
particular MEFs policy based on Chinese stock market. On US stock market, there are a 
series of forming analyst forecast system, and managers and analysts compete with each 
other. Even if MEFs are not issued by mandatory, there will be enough earnings 
information in stock market. On the contrary, there are not so many competitive analysts' 
forecasts for all the listed firms in China stock market that it is very difficult for 
investors to get earnings information from market alone. Therefore, to warn investors, 
CSRC requires the firms who suffered a larger earnings change to issue MEFs. 
Second, this paper fills the gaps of empirical evidence on MEFs specificity hypothesis 
III the growing emerging market, Chinese stock market. For lacking of researches on 
forecast specificity and forecast approach of MEFs, this study's results provide some 
evidences on this field. 
Third, different from using symmetric interval as the study event window selected by 
prior empirical studies, three sub-intervals around MEFs' disclosure day are chosen in this 
paper to test share price reaction at the period before MEFs disclosure day, after MEFs 
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disclosure day and through MEFs disclosure day. Based on the results of various event 
windows , 1 got some new findings. 
Finally , this paper also contributes to an important research issue of using analysts' 
forecast as benchmark to classify the sign of news on Chinese stock market , where the 
policy of analysts' forecast just experience more than 10 years. And the results of this 
paper confirm that analyst forecast is a developing system , and there are not enough 
competitive analyst forecasts on Chinese stock market , which is unlike US mature stock 
market. 
論文審査結果の要旨
本論文は、企業経営者による今期の利益予想の公表(以下、 MEF) が当該企業の株価に与える
影響を公表目前後の平均異常収益率(以下、 CAR) を用いて計測し、 MEF が事前のアナリスト予
想の平均よりも良いニュースか悪いニュースかという情報が CAR に与える影響の分析を行う実証
研究である。中国株式市場の特徴である強制的な MEF か自主的な MEF かによる市場の反応の違
いを分析している点と MEF の表現方法による市場の反応の違いを中国株市場において分析してい
る点は、本研究における独自な点として評価できる。なお、 MEF の表現には、 1 つの数字、範囲、
最小値、最大値、ことばによる表現の 5 通りがある。分析期間はアナリスト予想データが入手可能
な 2005年度から 2011年度、総標本数は2522である。
まず、 CAR は良いニュースに対しては統計的に有意に正の値を取り、悪いニュースに対しては
有意に負の値となることが確認される。次に、理論的そして実証的な先行研究を基に立てられた複
数の仮説の検証が行われる。仮説 1 r悪いニュースに対する反応は、良いニュースよりも大きい」
は、本研究では否定された。仮説 2 r強制的 MEF への反応は、自主的 MEF への反応よりも大き
い」は、公表日の 2 日前から公表日までの期間の良いニュースに関する CAR にだけ見られたが、
他の期間及び悪いニュースの CAR については確認できなかった。仮説 3 r 1 つの数字による
MEF は、良いニュースより悪いニュースの場合に、より選択される」は、ロジスティック回帰で
分析がなされ、仮説が成立することが示された。仮説 4 r悪いニュースと良いニュースに分けた上
で、 1 つの数字による MEF に対する CAR の大きさは、範囲、最小値、最大値で示された MEF
よりも大き L 、」に関する実証結果は以下の通りである。まず、悪いニュースに対する反応は、最小
値による公表以外では、すべて有意に負となったが、良いニュースに対する反応は、最小値による
公表でのみ有意に正となった。また、最小値による公表では良いニュースに対する反応の大きさが
悪いニュースに対する反応の大きさを有意に上回った。対して、最大値による公表では悪いニュー
スに対する反応の大きさが良いニュースに対する反応の大きさを有意に上回った。仮説 4 について
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は、悪いニュースでも良いニュースでも l つの数字による公表が他の方法による公表より CAR の
大きさが大きいという結果は、得られなかった。ただし、悪いニュースに関しては、最大値の公表
に対する反応が範囲または最小値の公表より有意に大きいことと、良いニュースに関しては、最小
値による公表に対する反応が l つの数字または範囲による公表より有意に大きいという興味深い事
実を発見した。以上の 2 つのケースは、経営者は、最も控えめな悪い予想あるいは良い予想を公表
することに相当し、投資家の反応として大きい反応を示すことは、合理的と解釈できる。
本研究は、中国株式市場における経営者の利益予想の公表が株式市場に与える影響を分析したも
のである。複数の仮説の検証を行った結果、利益予想の表現方法による市場の反応の違いなど興味
深い新しい知見を得ているO
以上より本論文は博士(経営学)論文として「合格」であると判定する。
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